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The First Amendment of the United States Constitution contains
two clauses relating to religion.' The Free Exercise Clause prohibits re-
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment's "Establishment" and "Free Exercise"
clauses provide in pertinent part that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Id.
The religion clauses are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947) (Establishment Clause held applicable to
states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Free Exercise clause held applica-
ble to states).
The presence of the religion clauses in the Constitution is credited to the influence of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030 (2d Ed. 1983) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Madison authored ME-
MORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE in 1785 during a bitter fight against a tax levy for Virginia's
established church. The polemic was apparently effective-the tax levy was defeated and
Virginia passed its Bill for Religious Liberty, a precursor of the first amendment's religion
clauses. Id.
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strictions on religious beliefs,2 and the Establishment Clause prohibits
the government from aiding or formally establishing a religion.3 In con-
sidering the constitutionality of state involvement in sectarian education,
the Supreme Court has held that a total separation between church and
state is impossible.4 Although this controversy has focused primarily on
state aid to private schools,' the question of excessive government intru-
sion recently has arisen as a result of attempts by labor relations boards a
2 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). An individual is free to worship and
be affiliated with any religious organization he chooses, id., because the Constitution abso-
lutely prohibits the proscription of any religious belief by the government. See HANDBOOK,
supro note 1, at 1053.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). See also T. JEFFERSON, LETTER OF
JAN. 1, 1802, reprinted in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Bergh ed.
1903):
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legisla-
tive powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Id. Although the original purpose of the "wall" was intended to prevent government aid to
religion, the modern view is that it also prohibits all preference for religion over non-reli-
gion. See HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
' See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
stated: "Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable." Id. at 614. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (first amendment does not state in all respects church and state should be sepa-
rated). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 843 (1978) (im-
practicability of complete separation between church and state).
In Lemon the Court invalidated two state attempts to subsidize the cost of parochial
school education. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616. The Court struck down these statutes because it
found that they fostered an excessive administrative entanglement between church and
state. Id. at 618. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held that in assessing the
degree of entanglement, three factors were to be considered: (1) whether the challenged law
or conduct had a secular purpose; (2) whether its principle or primary effect was to advance
or inhibit religion; (3) and whether it will foster an excessive entanglement of government
with religion. Id. at 612-13.
See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371-72 (1975) (Pennsylvania statute authorizing
various types of aid to parochial schools held unconstitutional except for textbook loan pro-
vision); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973)
(New York statute granting aid to parochial schools for costs incurred in test administration
and record keeping was unconstitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing direct subsidies to parochial schools
deemed unconstitutional). See also Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) (examines constitutionality of state support for church-related
schools).
' See National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). The
NLRA was enacted by Congress in 1935 to prevent the obstruction of commerce by securing
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to assert jurisdiction over the labor relations of parochial schools and
their lay teachers. 7 While the Supreme Court has expressly left this ques-
tion open, s lower courts have consistently held that these attempts to reg-
ulate the activities of parochial schools are unconstitutional.9 Recently,
however, in Catholic High School Association v. Culvert'0 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the first amend-
for workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. at § 151. The
Act also created a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to administer the Act and in-
sure employment relations through its adjudicatory, supervisory, and rulemaking powers. Id.
The New York State Labor Relations Act (SLRA) was modeled after the NLRA. See
New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 482, 63 N.E.2d 68,
72 (1945). "The [NLRA] and the [SLRA] are not only alike in their provisions but are
almost identical in their language." Id. at 492, 63 N.E.2d at 74. See generally K. HANSLOWE,
PROCEDURES AND POLICIES OF THE NEW YORK STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 9-14 (1964)
(comparing SLRA with NLRA).
While the state and national acts are substantially similar, the SLRA was amended in
1968 to include parochial school teachers. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1977). Approving
the 1968 amendment bringing employees of religious associations within the coverage of the
SLRA, Governor Rockefeller stated "[t]hese workers will now enjoy the full protection of
the [SLRA] so that they may bargain collectively with their respective employers through
representatives of their choice." Ch. 890, 1968 N.Y. Laws 2389 (McKinney) (amending N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1977)).
7 See Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 440
U.S. 490 (1979). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the NLRB misinterpreted its scope of authority as extending to religiously affiliated
schools. Id. at 1114. The Court noted that the NLRB's initial act of certifying a union as
the bargaining agent for lay teachers would impinge upon the discretion of church authori-
ties to direct teachers in accord with religious tenets. Id. Concluding that religious schools
are an integral part of the Church, the Court declared that governmental interference with
management prerogatives, condoned in an ordinary setting, was not acceptable in an area
protected by the first amendment. Id. See also Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore,
216 N.L.R.B. 249 (1975) (NLRB jurisdiction inhibits religious exercise). See generally Com-
ment, The Free Exercise Clause, The NLRA, And Parochial School Teachers, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 631, 632-38 (1978) (background of NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools); Warner,
NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 73 Nw.
U.L. REV. 463, 472 (1978) (review of Seventh Circuit holding in Catholic Bishop).
8 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In dictum, the Supreme Court noted that
there was a serious risk of excessive government entanglement with religion if the NLRB
asserted its jurisdiction. Id. at 504. However, the Court avoided the constitutional issue and
held that the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to bring parochial schools
within the NLRB's jurisdiction conclusively indicated that no other authority existed for
such jurisdiction at church-operated schools. Id. at 504-05.
9 See, e.g., Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977) (NLRB jurisdiction over
lay faculty at Catholic schools unconstitutional); McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F.Supp. 1337,
1344 (M.D.Pa. 1978) (NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools violates Constitution's reli-
gion clauses); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F.Supp. 618, 623 (E.D.Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 957 (1978) (NLRB regulation of parochial school employer violates Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses).
10 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ment did not prohibit the New York State Labor Relations Board
(SLRB) from asserting jurisdiction over parochial schools."
In Catholic High School Association, the teachers' union and the
Catholic High School Association (the Association) were involved in con-
tract negotiations over employment conditions." In the midst of negotia-
tions, the Union filed charges alleging that the Association had engaged in
unfair labor practices, violating the State Labor Relations Act (SLRA). 3
After these charges were filed, the State Labor Relations Board (SLRB)
conducted a confidential investigation, which resulted in the issuance of a
formal complaint against the Association. 4
In response, the Association brought an action seeking both declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the SLRB.1" The Association challenged
the SLRB's assertion of jurisdiction, alleging that the Board's action vio-
lated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first amend-
ment, and that SLRB jurisdiction was preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act.'6 The Association filed a motion for summary judgment. 7
The district court granted the motion, thereby enjoining the SLRB from
continuing its proceeding against the Association."'
Id. at 1167-69. In Catholic High School the Second Circuit answered the constitutional
question avoided by Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop. Compare id. at 1162 with Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 508. The court further concluded that "the First Amendment prohibits
the State Board from inquiring into an asserted religious motive to determine whether it is
pretextual. Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1168. However the court maintained that the
SLRB "is still free to determine, using a dual motive analysis, whether the religious motive
was in fact the cause of the discharge." Id.
11 Id. From 1969 to 1980, the Union and the Board entered into a series of collective bar-
gaining agreements governing the secular terms and conditions of employment of lay teach-
ers. Id. at 1163. The agreements were expressly limited to non-sectarian issues and specifi-
cally excluded religious faculty from unions. Id.
11 Id. at 1163. The Union alleged that the Association had violated sections 704(5) and
704(10) of the SLRA. Id. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 704 (McKinney 1977). Section 704 enumer-
ates ten labor practices in which it is unlawful for an employer to engage. N.Y. LAB. LAW §
704(5), (10) (McKinney 1977). The applicable subsections provide in pertinent part: "It
shall be unfair labor practice for an employer: (5) To encourage . . . or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization;. . .(10) To do any acts . . . which interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed [by this Act]." Id.




'8 Id. Judge Lasker held that the application of the SLRA to lay teachers threatened to
produce excessive entanglement between church and state and therefore violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. Catholic High School, 573 F.Supp. at 1156. The district court further
stated that because the SLRB's good faith bargaining requirement might lead to negotia-
tions over religion matters, entanglement might arise. Id. Further, because the SLRB had
the power to investigate unfair labor practice charges, it will be unavoidable for the SLRB
to avoid confronting religious issues. Id. at 1157.
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On appeal, a divided Second Circuit panel reversed the district court
on the constitutional issue, holding that neither the Establishment Clause
nor the Free Exercise Clause had been violated." In determining that the
Establishment Clause had not been violated, the Second Circuit utilized
the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test.20 The majority held that the
nature of the state intrusion into the bargaining process did not create an
excessive administrative entanglement.2
'9 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1161 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Cardamone wrote the ma-
jority opinion in which Judge Friedman joined, and Judge Pratt filed a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 1171.
The Court, deciding several threshold matters before reaching the first amendment
question, affirmed the opinion of the district court holding that the NLRA did not preempt
the jurisdiction of the SLRB's. Id. at 1165. For a further discussion of the preemption issue
see supra note 11.
Moreover, the court maintained that a justiciable controversy existed and stated that
"the record affords abundant evidence that the [SLRB's] exercise of jurisdiction over teach-
ers in church-operated schools would implicate the guarantees of the Religion Clauses."
Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1165.
While addressing the constitutional issue, Judge Cardamone noted that an accomoda-
tion could be made between the first amendment rights of the Association and the secular
interests of the lay teachers. Id. at 1168-69. The judge relied on NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-17 (1969), to support the proposition that the Supreme Court seeks to
accomodate apparently irreconcilable interests in the labor area whenever possible. Catholic
High School, 753 F.2d at 1169. The Association urged that if the SLRB was permitted to
assert jurisdiction, a parochial school might be forced to reinstate a teacher it might have
otherwise fired for religious reasons, simply because the school administration was partially
motivated by anti-union animus. Id.
Judge Cardamone reasoned that the SLRB may, consistent with the first amendment,
protect teachers from unlawful discharge by limiting it findings of a violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to those cases in which a teacher would not have been discharged
"but for" the unlawful motivation. Id.
Judge Pratt concurred with the majority on the two threshold issues, but dissented on
the constitutional issue for the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion and in the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Catholic Bishop. Id. at 1171. (Pratt, J., dissenting).
20 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1165. See supra note 4 (discussion of Lemon v.
Kurtzman).
2" Id. at 1166. To support the proposition that state intrusion in the bargaining process did
not create an excessive entanglement, the court first made use of EEOC v. Mississippi Col-
lege, 626 F.2d 477, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981) which held that
a wide ranging investigation into many aspects of the hiring procedures of a religious college
did not constitute excessive administrative entanglement. See id.
Second, the court relied upon the fact that the ten unfair labor practices specified in §
704 of the SLRA, see supra note 13, are entirely secular. Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at
1167. Moreover, Judge Cardamone noted that an order issued by the SLRB is not self en-
forcing; a parochial school may refuse to comply with SLRB orders and raise a First Amend-
ment defense when and if the SLRB seeks judicial enforcement. Id.
Third, the court analogized the SLRB proceeding to those of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which have been held to be nonintrusive, stating that the
SLRB proceedings are no more intrusive than those of the EEOC. Catholic High School,
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Addressing the Association's Free Exercise claim, the Second Circuit
maintained that collective bargaining was not contrary to the beliefs of
the Catholic Church. 22 Judge Cardamone further stressed that SLRB ju-
risdiction would not impermissibly chill the Association's Free Exercise
rights. 23 Moreover, the court reasoned that any indirect and incidental
burden placed on religion by the exercise of SLRB jurisdiction was justi-
fied by the State's compelling interest in collective bargaining.24
753 F.2d at 1166.
22 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1169. The court recognized that "[flreedom to believe
is absolute. Freedom to act is not." Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940)). The Cantwell Court recognized that although freedom to believe is absolute, all
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Cantwell v. Connect-
icut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
The court in Catholic High School relied upon Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
for a balancing test which weighs the burden SLRB jurisdiction would impose on the free
exercise rights of the Association against the interest of the State in enforcing the Act.
Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1169. In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin
could not require members of the Amish Church to send their children to public schools
after the eighth grade. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
employed a tripartite test to consider whether: (1) the claims presented were religious in
nature and not secular; (2) the state action burdened the religious exercise; (3) the state's
interest was sufficiently compelling to override the free exercise of religion. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 214-15.
The Catholic High School court observed that the claim of the Association will be con-
sidered religious and not secular if regulation by the SLRB interferes with the Association's
freedom to maintain certain religious beliefs. Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1169. Judge
Cardamone however, concluded that the claim presented was not religious because the
SLRB regulates religious conduct, not beliefs, which the state has a right to do under its
police power. Id. The court further held that regulations which merely cause economic hard-
ship or inconvenience are often upheld. Id. (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961))
(Sunday closing laws did not violate free exercise of Orthodox Jewish merchants since only
nonreligious conduct was regulated).
The court also maintained that for nearly 100 years the Catholic Church has been a
strong supporter of the rights of employees to organize and bargain as a unit. Catholic High
School, 753 F.2d at 1170. (citing Kryvourka, The Church, the State, and the National La-
bor Relations Act: Collective Bargaining in the Parochial Schools, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV.
33, 52 n.74 (1978)). The court relied on a recent Bishop's Pastoral letter which reaffirmed
the commitment of the Catholic Church to social and economic justice, as well as collective
bargaining. Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1170 (citing Bishop's Pastoral Letter of No-
vember 11, 1984 (reprinted in N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1984, at B-11, cols. 5 & 6)).
23 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1170-71. In Catholic Bishop, the Seventh Circuit
found, "[t]o minimize friction between the Church and the [SLRB], prudence will ulti-
mately dictate that the [Association] tailor [its] conduct and decisions to 'steer far wider of
the unlawful zone' of impermissible conduct." Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1124. (citation
omitted). Judge Cardamone rejected this argument, holding that a compelling state interest,
the preservation of institutional peace and sound economic order, existed. Catholic High
School, 753 F.2d at 1171.
2" Id. Judge Cardamone reasoned that the compelling state interest in enforcing the SLRA
outweighs the incidental burden on religion. Id.
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In Catholic High School Association, the Second Circuit is purported
to have conclusively addressed the constitutionality of SLRB jurisdiction
over parochial schools. It is submitted, however, that while the court was
correct, in recognizing that the conflict implicated both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses, its analysis was insufficient to support the
constitutionality of the statute in question. This Comment will suggest
that a proper analysis of the two religion clauses requires a detailed fac-
tual review of the degree of intrusiveness of the continuing exercise of
SLRB jurisdiction. It will also suggest that under such a comprehensive
analysis of the SLRB's actual involvement with a religious school, the
Board's action would not survive the appropriate first amendment
scrutiny.
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES
Although recognized as overlapping doctrines,2" the two religion
clauses of the first amendment have been analyzed under independent
frameworks.26 The aim of the Free Exercise Clause was to avoid interfer-
ence from the state, which may coerce individuals" to forgo their reli-
gious practices and beliefs. 28 The Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection against "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity. 2' Despite their being
cast in absolute terms, 0 the religion clauses cannot completely be sepa-
" See Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1131. (each clause has the identical purpose of main-
taining separation between Church and State); McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp 1337,
1351 (M.D.Pa. 1978) (recognizing that the two religion clauses are intertwined). See also
Kurkland, Of Church and State and The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961)
(Free Exercise and Establishment Clause should be read as stating single precept).
2" See infra note 27 and accompanying text for the Free Exercise analysis and, see infra
note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Establishment Clause analysis.
27 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973);
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430 (1962). In each case the court mentioned the need to prove the coercive effect
of government regulations. It has been suggested that any regulation which substantially
impairs the practice of religion will be sufficiently coercive to merit further review. See
HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
28 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (objection to mandatory secondary education by
Amish parents); Gillette v. United States 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objector exemp-
tion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting minor from selling
magazines). See also Forkosch, Religion, Education, and the Constitution - A Middle Way,
23 Loy. L. REV. 617, 639 (1977) ("the free exercise clause apparently deals with persons, i.e.,
their personal free exercise of religious beliefs and faiths...").
29 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See also supra note 4, (no absolute separation of church
and state) See generally M. MCCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE AND THE
SCHOOLS (1983) (overview of function of establishment clause in relation to parochial
schools).
30 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
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rated. 3 1 When either is extended to its logical extreme, there is a clash
between the policies of each clause."2 Inasmuch as the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses represent different aspects of religious freedom,"3 it
is submitted that both religion clauses must be considered in determining
the constitutionality of SLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools.
FREE EXERCISE : THE Yoder TEST APPLIED
The right to free exercise of religion can be separated into freedoms
of belief, action, and religious hierarchy.34 The Supreme Court, in Wis-
consin v. Yoder,35 determined that it is necessary to ascertain whether the
claims presented involve the practice of a legitimate religious belief, the
state action burdens the religious exercise, and if the state interest is suf-
ficiently compelling to override the constitutional right of free exercise. 36
LEGITIMACY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
A legitimate religious belief is one which is founded upon theocratic
principles which pervade the daily lives and lifestyles of its believers.3 7 It
Burger maintained that the religion clauses "are cast in absolute terms." Id. Thomas Jeffer-
son described the religion clauses as a "wall of separation" between church and state. See
supra note 3.
" See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 670. Chief Justice Burger also stated that "no
perfect or absolute separation is really possible." Id. See also supra note 25, (discussing
overlapping of Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
" See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. The Court stated that if either is "expanded to a logical
extreme, [each clause] would tend to clash with the other." Id. There is a "natural antago-
nism between the prohibition of establishing a religion and the desire not to inhibit its
practices." HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1029. This antagonism between the clauses fre-
quently requires the Supreme Court to choose among competing values in first amendment
cases. Id. The Court is generally guided by the concept of neutrality. Id. The competing
values also demand that the State act to achieve only secular goals and that it achieve in a
religiously neutral manner. Id. Unfortunately, cases arise where the State has no alternative
but to indirectly aid or infringe upon religious practices. Id.
33 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Judge
Rutledge stated that " '[E]stablishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive
ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom." Id..
Similarly, in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring), Justice Brennan reasoned that "[tihe inclusion of both restraints upon the
power of Congress to legislate concerning religious matters shows unmistakably that the
Framers of the First Amendment were not content to rest the protection of religious liberty
upon either clause." Id. at 232
"4 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
35 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra note 22.
36 Id.
31 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-17. In Yoder the Court found that the Amish lifestyle, educa-
tional practices and refusal to submit their children to further secular education were reli-
gion. Id. Central to this determination were the following facts: (1) this was a shared belief
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is generally maintained that the operation of a parochial school consti-
tutes the practice of a legitimate religious belief."8 The purpose of such a
school is to perpetuate the teachings of the religion, 9 and all teachers are
expected to assist in this ecclesiastical undertaking.40 The Supreme Court
has stated that secular education and religious mission in parochial
schools are "inextricably intertwined," with religious mission in fact being
the "only reason for the schools' existence.""'
The Second Circuit, while not questioning the legitimacy of the Asso-
ciation's religious beliefs, noted that "courts have long upheld regulation
that merely causes economic hardship or inconvenience. '42 The Supreme
Court, however, has determined that the relative directness of govern-
mental interference is not an appropriate standard. 41 If the standard sug-
gested by Judge Cardamone is applied, however, the SLRB would have
the power to issue direct orders if the Association's conduct was found to
constitute an unfair labor practice."' 4 Therefore, it is suggested that the
parochial schools at issue were sufficiently religious to meet the constitu-
by an organized group rather than a personal preference, (2) the belief related to certain
theocratic principles and interpretations of religious literature; (3) the system of beliefs per-
vaded and regulated their daily lives; (4) the system of belief and life style resulting there-
from had been in existence for a substantial period of time. Id.
" See e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, at 618-19 (1971) (schools are a powerful vehi-
cle for transmitting Catholic faith). Public Funds for Public Schools of N.J. v. Byrne, 590
F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir.) (generally accepted "fact" that parochial schools are pervasively reli-
gious), aff'd, 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Catholic Bishop v. N.L.R.B. 559 F.2d 1112, 1120-23 (7th
Cir. 1977). (parochial schools are pervasively religious institutions). See also L. BOETTNER,
ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360 (1962) (purpose of schools is to make loyal Roman Catholics).
10 THE CODE OF CANON LAW, Canons 803 (English trans. 1983). See also DECLARATION ON
CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 642-43 (1966) (Church is bound to
give parochial school children education through which their "entire lives can be penetrated
with the spirit of Christ"); J. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 86 (1958)
(parochial school taught with the goal of religious education in mind).
'0 See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 635; Catholic Bishop,
559 F.2d at 1122.
" Lemon, 403 U.S. at 657 (1971).
" Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1169. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
(1961) (Pennsylvania Sunday closing law did not violate free exercise of Orthodox Jewish
merchants).
"' See e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, (1963) (statute that denied plaintiff unemploy-
ment benefits when she was discharged for observing Saturday Sabbath unconstitutional);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relative directness of
interference not appropriate standard). See also Comment, Religious Accomodation Under
Sherbert v. Verner: The Common Sense of the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REv. 337, 345 (1965)
(directness of governmental interference not a helpful standard).
"4 See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 706 (1) (McKinney 1977). Section 706(1) gives the SLRB the power
to directly intervene to insure that unfair labor practices do not violate any employees'
rights. Id. The section provides that "the board is empowered and directed... to prevent
any employer from engaging in any unfair labor practice." Id.
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tional test for a legitimate free exercise claim. 5
BURDENS ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
A statute burdens religious conduct if, because of its application, it
unreasonably restricts the exercise of that religion in some cognizable
fashion.46 Collective bargaining is not per se an unreasonable burden to
the beliefs of the Catholic Church;4 7 indeed, many parochial schools have
permitted their lay teachers to organize. 48
Parochial schools, however, maintain that because their teachings are
so pervasively religious,49 nearly all activities that are appropriate for
mandatory collective bargaining embrace religious matters.50 Moreover,
once a union bargaining agent has a statutory mandate, such as that
granted by the SLRB, those subjects that are open to labor negotiation
often expand to include issues religious in nature."' Such expanded juris-
diction may have a chilling effect on the religious freedom of parochial
" Compare Catholic High School, 753 F.2d 1161 (parents have right to choose alternate
parochial school education for their children) with Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents'
right to instruct their children in attitudes consistent with Amish religion). See also Freund,
supra note 5, at 664 (comparing the religious claim in Yoder with the parochial school labor
relations cases).
" See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15; HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1061.
'7 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1170; see supra note 24.
," See Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1163; Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1114; McCor-
mick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1340. See generally Kryvoruka, The Church, The State and
The National Labor Relations Act: Collective Bargaining in the Parochial Schools, 20 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 33, 34 (review of NLRB cases involving parochial schools).
"' See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
"' See Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1129; McCormick v. Hirsh, 460 F.Supp. 1337, 1353
(M.D.Pa. 1978); Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp. 618, 624 (E.D.Pa. 1976). See also M. Mc-
CARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 153 (1983) (NLRB
jurisdiction over parochial schools would "open the door to conflicts between clergy-admin-
istrators and the [NLRB] or conflicts with negotiators for unions.")
" See Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1075
(1969). Professor Brown has stated that:
Once a bargaining agent has the weight of statutory certification behind it, a familiar
process comes into play. First, the matter of salaries is linked to the matter of work
load, work load is then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings,
and range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also lead to
bargaining over admissions policies.
Id. This observation has been documented by other commentators. See, e.g., Klaus, The
Evolution of Collective Bargaining Relationships in Public Education: New York City
Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1033, (1969) (graphic illustration of how
bargaining over minor subjects in school negotiations escalates to encompass major issues).
See generally Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63, 80 (1973) (quoting Prof. Brown, includes evi-
dence that his assertions are correct).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING, 1986
schools. 2 Indeed, a school may agree to bargain and compromise on pol-
icy questions because litigation through the SLRB proceedings is too
costly or upsetting. 53
SLRB jurisdiction over the Association further burdens free exercise
rights by dividing the faculty into camps of lay and religious teachers.6 4
This division, although alleged to be secular, violates the right of the pa-
rochial school to maintain the single, undivided community of faith con-
templated by its religious mission."' The first amendment, however, was
designed to protect against the evil of "division along religious lines." '
Ironically, because parochial schools are such an integral part of the
Church's religious mission, they are often prohibited from receiving pub-
lic funds. 57 Allowing the SLRB to assert jurisdiction as the Second Circuit
has done would "cruelly whipsaw" the parochial schools by holding them
too religious to receive government assistance, yet not religious enough to
be exempt from government regulation. 8
The Supreme Court, in Yoder, has committed religious education
62 See supra note 25.
"' See Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1124. The Seventh Circuit noted that "to minimize
friction between the Church and the [NLRB], prudence will ultimately dictate that the
bishop tailor his conduct and decisions to 'steer far wide of the unlawful zone' of impermis-
sible conduct. Id. But cf. Comment, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 463, 472 (1978) (criticism of "chill" analysis in Catholic Bishop).
654 See McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1353. In McCormick, the court noted that
divisiveness along religious lines seems inevitable when lay and religious teachers are sepa-
rated into two discrete and possibly conflicting camps. Id.; Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp.
at 625.
66 See supra note 51. But see Comment, supra note 7, at 646 (any interference with reli-
gious freedom that is claimed to be caused by divisiveness along religious lines in this in-
stance is minimal and consequently need not be viewed seriously).
" Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976) See Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (danger of political divisiveness). But see Note, The Sacred Wall
Revisited, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 118 (1972) (criticism of political divisiveness inquiry because it
is difficult to apply). But cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (political divisiveness never independent ground for holding government prac-
tice unconstitutional).
67 See supra note 5 for a discussion of parochial aid cases.
" Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1119. Noting that the NLRB wishes to assert jurisdiction
despite the fact that attempts by government to aid parochial schools have been invali-
dated, the court stated:
A church which chooses to educate its own young people in schools which it is re-
quired essentially to finance without governmental aid should because of the essen-
tially religious permeation of its curriculum be equally freed of the obviously inhib-
iting effect and impact of the restrictions of the [NLRA] in conducting the teaching
program of those schools.
Id. at 1130 See, Comment, Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 463, 479 (1978).
The potential effect of holding parochial schools too religious to be regulated by the NLRB
makes any future attempts at providing government aid troublesome. Id.
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and upbringing to the private processes of church and family. 9 This pro-
tects not only a family's choice of a child's parochial school education, but
the schools operation as well.
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
A state interest is compelling when it is of great enough importance
to warrant superiority over an individual's free exercise rights and would
be impaired by allowing the exercise of those rights to override the statu-
tory regulation.6 0
In considering the state interests involved, the Second Circuit rea-
soned that even if the exercise of SLRB jurisdiction was an indirect and
incidental burden on parochial school employment decisions involving re-
ligious issues, this intrusion was minimal and was justified by the compel-
ling interest of the state in collective bargaining.61 The Supreme Court,
however, has yet to find an instance when a burden on religious exercise
is justified by a weightier state interest.'2 Indeed, the Court has invali-
dated aid programs to parochial schools on first amendment grounds de-
spite the fact that the continued existence of the schools was essential to
avoid a crisis in the public schools.6 3
An appropriate analysis of the state's interest must seriously consider
the presence of an extraordinary free exercise interest in the parochial
school, that of transferring shared values and beliefs from one generation
to the next.64 Moreover, parochial schools provide parents with an alter-
native in the educational and religious development of their children,
which adds credence to the parochial school's free exercise claim." It is
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (1972). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state may
not enter private realm of family life without justification); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284, 288 (1927) (state cannot strip parents control of child's education). See generally
M. MCCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN CHURCH, STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 143 (1983)
(overview of the right of parents to send children to parochial schools).
" See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
" Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1171.
82 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-48 (1977) (state interest in providing pub-
licly supported diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services by public employees at paro-
chial school held unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975) (state inter-
est in providing publicly supported remedial and therapeutic counseling given inside
parochial school held to violate the Free Exercise Clause). See generally Note, Establish-
ment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1175, 1178 (1979) (no government interest is compelling enough to justify entanglement).
"2 See supra note 5.
" See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. See also A. GRELLEY, W. McCREADY AND K.
MCCOURT, CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN A DECLINING CHURCH 157-95, 251-53 (1976) (survey research
indicates Catholic Schools have measurable permanent effects on their graduate's values).
6 See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 625 (schools
represent both institutional and parental rights in religious education).
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therefore submitted that the free exercise interests of the parochial
schools - the religious freedom of continuity and choice - outweigh the
state's interest in regulation of labor relations.
ESTABLISHMENT - THE Lemon TEST APPLIED
The Establishment Clause prohibits government aid to religion, as
well as the favoring of religion over non-religion. 6 The Supreme Court, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, determined that when a government practice is al-
leged to be in violation of the Establishment Clause, it is necessary to
ascertain whether: the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose;
its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion; and
whether it will foster an excessive entanglement of government with
religion.67
Following this tripartite analysis the court in Catholic High School
concluded that the exercise of SLRB jurisdiction did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.' While it is clear that the SLRA has a secular pur-
pose and that its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit reli-
gion,6 9 it remains necessary to determine if SLRB surveillance of religious
institutions or its resolution of internal religious disputes will foster an
excessive administrative entanglement.7"
The religious nature of the schools is not contested. 71 In such secta-
rian schools the Supreme Court has recognized that religious doctrine
may mix with secular instruction.7 2 Thus, while the SLRA provides for
mandatory collective bargaining between the employer and the union
See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 956 (6th Cir.
1985), rev'd, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) In Dayton, the court stated "the prohibitions which the
clause represents apply equally to government benefits to and burdens on religion." Id. See
also HANDBOOK, supra note 1 (accepted view today is that Establishment Clause prohibits
preference for religion over non-religion).
" See supra note 2. But cf. Wallace v. Jaffe, 53 U.S.L.W. 4679 (U.S. June 28, 1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (suggests abandoning the Lemon-establishment test).
68 Catholic High School, 753 F.2d at 1167-1170. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying
text.
o1 See supra note 21.
70 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 869-70 (1978). See infra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text. See also McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. at 1357 (apply Tribe test
for excessive entanglement).
"' See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 618-19 (parochial schools and teachers will
inevitably experience great difficulty remaining religiously neutral); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. at 370 (religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular matters); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. at 472, 480 (1973) (religious doctrine
will mix with secular education). See generally Ripply, The Entanglement Test of The Re-
ligion Clauses - A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980) (overview of inter-
relation between religious doctrine and secular instruction in parochial schools).
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over such secular issues as "wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment, '73 religious issues may also become intertwined in
negotiations. This is especially true given the statutory certification of the
bargaining process and the expansive construction given the phrase
"terms and conditions of employment".7" This might lead to inquiry by
the SLRB into the good faith of religious positions asserted by parochial
administrators. 75
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has reasoned that it is not only the
conclusion reached by a regulatory agency that may impinge on the
school's first amendment rights, but the "very process of inquiry leading
to findings and conclusions. 7 6 Thus, it is submitted that in light of the
pervasively religious character of the schools, there is a genuine threat
that sectarian matters will become part of the bargaining process as a
result of SLRB jurisdiction, creating an unconstitutionally excessive ad-
ministrative entanglement.
CONCLUSION
The resolution of the constitutional question presented in Catholic
High School Association v. Culvert will profoundly affect the future of
parochial school labor relations. Notwithstanding the observations of the
Second Circuit that SLRB jurisdiction does not violate the constitutional
standard developed by the Supreme Court, it is suggested that the regula-
tory requirements imposed by the Catholic High School court are viola-
tive of both first amendment religion clauses. The resulting conflicts and
confrontations between the SLRB and the schools will result in an entan-
13 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 705(1) (McKinney 1977). See supra note 6.
" See supra note 51 and accompanying text. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fireboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcontracting); In re Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 516
(1966) (partial shutdown); In re United States Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 889 (1951) (timing and se-
quence of layoffs), modified on others grounds, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953).
" See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502. The Supreme Court noted that it is clear that the
Board's action will go beyond resolving factual issues. Id. The resolution of such charges by
the NLRB, in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the
position asserted by the administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission.
Id. It is not only the conclusions that may be reached by the NLRB which may impinge on
rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to the
findings. Id. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1080.
The majority in Catholic Bishop added an appendix to its opinion which was an ex-
cerpt of an inquiry by an NLRB hearing officer regarding prayers at schools that involved
the questioning of a Catholic priest concerning the nature of a liturgy and its use in paro-
chial schools. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507. The Chief Justice noted that this type of
involvement between secular and religious authorities presented significant dangers to the
values protected by the Establishment Clause. Id.
76 Catholic High School v. Culvert, 573 F. Supp. 1550, 1557 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502).
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gling relationship that violates the spirit of freedom for religious organi-
zations that the religion clauses were intended to protect.
Louis F. Simonetti, Jr.
